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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43959 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-16115 
v.     ) 
     ) 
CHRISTOPHER JOHN   ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
OLEARAIN,    ) 
) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Christopher John Olearain pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The district court sentenced him to ten years, with two years fixed. Mr. Olearain appeals 
from the district court’s judgment of conviction, contending the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
   
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Olearain committed the crimes 
of felony driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), in violation of I.C. §§ 18-8004, 
-8005(9), and a misdemeanor for driving without privileges, in violation of I.C. § 18-
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8001. (R., pp.4–5.) At the time of the alleged offenses, Mr. Olearain had been on 
probation for thirteen months for a prior felony DUI conviction. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.8.) Mr. Olearain had served a retained jurisdiction (“a 
rider”) in the Correctional Alternative Placement Program (“CAPP”) before he was 
placed on probation. (PSI, p.8.)    
In the instant case, Mr. Olearain waived a preliminary hearing, and the 
magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.13–15.) The State filed an 
Information charging Mr. Olearain with DUI and driving without privileges. (R., pp.16–
17.)  
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Olearain pled guilty to DUI, and the State 
dismissed the misdemeanor charge. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.5, L.5–p.6, L.6, p.13, L.3–p.14, L.20.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Olearain to ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.12, Ls.22–25.) Mr. Olearain filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s 
Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.37–39, 42–43.) 
  
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten 
years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Olearain, following his guilty plea to DUI? 
 
                                            
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 110-page electronic document containing the 
confidential exhibits.  
2 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of 
plea hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing hearing.  
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Olearain, Following His Guilty Plea To DUI 
 
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Olearain’s 
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-8005(6), (9). 
Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Olearain “must 
show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).  
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be 
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). 
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. 
 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 
122, 132 (2011).  
Mr. Olearain asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends 
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that the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment or 
retained jurisdiction in light of the mitigating factors, including his need for treatment, 
past success on probation, and family support. 
Mr. Olearain’s alcohol abuse and need for treatment are strong factors in favor of 
mitigation. A sentencing court should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s 
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the 
suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
Here, the GAIN Recommendation and Referral Summary diagnosed Mr. Olearain with 
alcohol dependence. (PSI, p.25.) It recommended Level II.1 Intensive Outpatient 
treatment. (PSI, p.31.) Mr. Olearain “finally after much denial accepted the fact that [he] 
has an alcohol problem.” (PSI, p.110; see also PSI, pp.13–14.) He informed the district 
court that he was “doing everything in [his] power” to get treatment. (PSI, p.110.) For 
example, he signed up for the county jail’s Substance Abuse Program and wrote to 
Ascent Behavioral Health regarding their outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.14, 110.) 
Similarly, Mr. Olearain explained at sentencing that he struggled with alcohol abuse and 
actively was seeking out treatment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.9–22.)  
Further, Mr. Olearain has shown a commitment to treatment with his past 
success on the CAPP rider and probation. (PSI, p.8.) During the CAPP rider, 
Mr. Olearain received no formal or informal disciplinary sanctions. (PSI, p.56.) He 
completed the Moral Reconation Therapy (“MRT”) program and “internalized the 
program material.” (PSI, pp.55–56, 58.) Then on probation, Mr. Olearain did not have 
“any positive UAs or any issues or concerns.” (PSI, pp.8, 13.) He was completing his 
monthly reports and fully paid his restitution. (PSI, p.8.) He also completed the MRT 
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Aftercare Program and Men’s Relapse Prevention Aftercare Program. (PSI, p.8.) 
Further, Mr. Olearain maintained a stable residence and steady employment. He lived in 
his family home with his father and step-mother. (PSI, p.10.) His family was supportive. 
(PSI, pp.9, 57, 73.) Mr. Olearain’s father reported that his family would help him in any 
way, but would not “enable him.” (PSI, p.73; see also PSI, p.9.) Mr. Olearain worked for 
Bogus Basin Ski Resort until the end of the season and then worked in the construction 
field until the instant offense.  (PSI, p.12.)  
Mr. Olearain’s success on probation for thirteen months, despite his relapse, 
demonstrates that he has the tools and family support to overcome his alcohol 
addiction. In addition, he has fully acknowledged his alcohol problem and sought out 
treatment. Based on these mitigating circumstances, Mr. Olearain asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and declining to 
retain jurisdiction. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Olearain respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 31st day of May, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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